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CLONING AND REPRODUCTIVE LIBERTY
Francis J. Beckwith*
Can the principles that gave rise to reproductive liberty - principles that
undergird the reasoning of several United States Supreme Court decisions - be
extended to include the right to clone? I will attempt to answer that question in
this paper. However, prior to directly addressing that question, I will (1)
explain the science of cloning, and human cloning in particular; (2) present a
brief overview of the cloning controversy, as well as the political, legal, and
public reactions to it; and (3) discuss the possible uses for cloning, and interact
with some of the objections raised against the practice. I believe it is important
that we address these three topics so that we may better grasp the issue of
cloning and its implications for reproductive liberty.
I. WHAT IS CLONING?
In early 1997, Dr. Ian Wilmut, a Scottish scientist, made headlines when
he presented Dolly to the world, a sheep that he cloned from a six year-old ewe.
Three and one-half years earlier, Drs. Jerry Hall and Robert Stillman cloned a
human embryo by successfully splitting one human embryo into two.' This
process occurs naturally in the case of identical human twins, but Hall and
Stillman were the first to replicate this process artificially. And on October 13,
2001, scientists at Advanced Cell Technology (Worcester, Massachusetts)
made biomedical history when they became the first to produce a human
embryo by employing the same method used to produce Dolly.2 These human
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embryos did not survive for very long, with only one progressing to the six-cell
stage.
3
Although many of us are acquainted with the concept of cloning because
of popular films like Multiplicity, The Boys From Brazil, and The Sixth Day,
most people are unaware that cloning, as well as scientific and ethical discus-
sions of cloning, has been going on for decades. Technically, the word
"clone," in its most simple and strict sense, refers to a precise genetic copy of a
molecule, cell, plant, animal, or human being.4 Cloning has been part of the
world of horticulture and agriculture for quite a long time and serves as an
important contribution to our knowledge in contemporary biological research.
Indeed, genetically-identical copies of whole organisms are commonplace in
the plant-breeding world and are commonly referred to as "varieties" rather
than clones.5
In addition, scientists have been cloning human and animal genes for sev-
eral decades because it provides greater quantities of identical cells or genes for
study; each cloned cell or molecule is identical to the others.6 The clones that
result are not copies of whole organisms, but merely fragments of deox-
yribonucleic acid (DNA) (as in molecular cloning) or non-germ cells (as in
cellular cloning). Both of these types of cloning have important uses in devel-
oping new medicines, such as those employed in the treatment of diabetes,
heart attack, and kidney disease.7
The idea of cloning entire organisms can be traced back to a 1938 book by
Hans Spemann, an embryologist.8 In 1952, Thomas King and Robert Briggs
were the first to clone frog embryos.9 In 1962, entire adult frogs were first
cloned.'" Dolly was the first clone resulting from the genetic material of an
adult mammal. Researchers at the University of Wisconsin, Madison employed
the technology that produced Dolly to clone five different species, including
rhesus monkeys.1 1 The pregnancies miscarried, but the experiments did show
that the technology used to produce Dolly can be employed to generate living
embryos of a diversity of animals.1 2 Several generations of mice were cloned
by scientists at the University of Hawaii who used the Dolly method more
3 Id.
4 NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, 1 CLONING HUMAN BEINGS 13 (1997) (hereinafter
I NBAC).
5 Id. at 14.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 GINA KOLATA, CLONE: THE ROAD TO DOLLY, AND THE PATH AHEAD 47-51, 61 (1998).
See also HANS SPEMANN, EMBRYONIC DEVELOPMENT AND INDUCTION (1938).
9 KOLATA, supra note 8, at 61-65; Robert Briggs & Thomas King, Transplantation of Living
Nuclei from Blastula Cells Into Enucleated Frogs' Eggs, 38 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 455
(1952).
10 KOLATA, supra note 8, at 67.
11 5 Species Cloned Using Cow's Eggs, S.F CHRON., Jan. 19, 1998, at Al. I first read of
this story, as well as the remaining ones, in this paragraph in Stephanie J. Hong, And Cloning
Makes Three: A Constitutional Comparison Between Cloning and Other Assisted Reproduc-
tive Technologies, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 741, 747-48 (Spring 1999).
12 Id.
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efficiently. 3 It is alleged that, in December 1998, South Korean researchers
used this more efficient method to create a human embryo cloned from a thirty
year-old woman. According to this unconfirmed story, the researchers pre-
vented the embryo from developing past four cells.' 4 That same month, scien-
tists in Japan cloned eight calves in ten attempts by employing a variation on
the Dolly method.' 5
When a scientist refers to cloning an entire organism rather than merely a
cell or fragment of DNA, she may be speaking of one or both of two proce-
dures: (A) Embryo Cloning; or (B) Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer (SCNT)
Cloning.
A. Embryo Cloning
Hall and Stillman employed this type of cloning in their 1993 ground-
breaking experiment, in which they cloned a human embryo. Scientists have
been successfully using this cloning method with animals for many years. Hall
and Stillman began with what is called "in-vitro fertilization," or IVF: in a
laboratory, they produced human embryos in a petri dish by taking ova and
fertilizing them with male sperm. Medical ethicist Scott B. Rae explained the
process:
The embryos they used in their experiments had been fertilized by two sperm instead
of one, making them abnormal embryos and destined to die within a week. This
cloning process would be no different if the embryo were properly fertilized and had
a normal chance at becoming a baby if implanted.'
6
Hart and Stillman produced defective embryos rather than normal ones
because they did not intend for either the clones or the defective embryos to
develop into babies. 7 They just wanted to see if they could artificially clone a
human embryo.
In order to induce cloning, the scientists followed the subsequent proce-
dure. After they fertilized the ovum, the resulting zygote divided in two, which
is what occurs in normal development. The scientists then removed the zona
pellucida, "the coating that contains enzymes that promote cell division that is
necessary for growth and development."' 8 The two cells were then separated.
Because development cannot continue unless the zona pellucida is replaced,
Hall and Stillman "used an artificial zona pellucida to recoat the two embryonic
cells, enabling development to continue. As the cells [grew] they form[ed]
genetically identical embryos, a laboratory equivalent to what occurs naturally
13 Ellen Ruppel Shell, Cloning of Humans Will Be Inevitable; What Have We Done, Done,
Done?, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Jan. 5, 1999, at A6.
" Human Embryo Clone, S. Korean Team Claims, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 17, 1998, at Al.
'5 David Derbyshire, Made in Japan, A Herd of Cloned Calves, DAILY MAIL, Dec. 8, 1998,
at 9; Japanese Clone 8 Genetically Identical Calves from a Cell of Single Adult Cow, TRANS-
PLANT NEWS, Dec. 17, 1998.
16 ScoT B. RAE, BRAVE NEW FAMILIES 172-73 (1996).
17 Connie Cass, Spotlight Thrust on Scientists Who Cloned Human Embryos, LAS VEGAS
REVIEW-JOURNAL, Oct. 23, 1993, at IA, 2A.
18 RAE, supra note 16, at 173.
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in the body when identical twins are conceived." 9 However, because the
embryos were defective, they perished after six days.2 0
B. Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer (SCNT) Cloning
This is the type of cloning that produced Dolly. Because sheep, like
human beings, are mammals, scientists were able to clone a human being by
this same method in October 2001.
The DNA of every cell in the human body, except the sperm and egg,
contains the genetic material that, in theory, is capable of producing an identi-
cal clone of the body from which the cell is taken. But because nature pro-
grams the cells to perform certain functions (i.e., liver cells perform different
functions than brain cells), and because all other functions are dormant, a scien-
tist must replicate conception in order to bring into existence a new and geneti-
cally-identical human being. A scientist may accomplish this by extracting the
nucleus of a cell from the human body, fusing that cell with an ovum which has
had its nucleus removed, and then electrically stimulating this fused entity. It
was by this method that Scottish scientists brought Dolly into existence. But,
according to molecular biologist Dr. Raymond Bohlin,
[t]he process was inefficient. Out of 277 cell fusions, 29 began growing in vitro. All
29 were implanted in receptive ewes, 13 became pregnant, and only one lamb was
born as a result. This is a success rate of only 3.4%. In nature, somewhere between
33 and 50% of all fertilized eggs develop fully into newborns.
2 1
Of course, Dolly is not the same age as her six year-old twin, whose
genetic material was used to clone her. Thus, when scientists were able to
clone a human being by SCNT, the resulting clone will always be younger than
her twin, unlike the adult clones of the character played by actor Michael Kea-
ton in the film Multiplicity. As a result, if a twenty-four year-old woman were
to clone herself, her cloned twin would always be twenty-four years her junior.
Although embryo cloning is an important and controversial topic,2 2 this
paper will focus primarily on SCNT, which is what most ethicists, legal schol-
ars, public policy experts, and ordinary citizens mean when they say that they
oppose or support human cloning. Nevertheless, some of the moral and legal
questions raised by human cloning may apply to embryo cloning as well.
II. THE CLONING CONTROVERSY: LEGAL, POLITICAL,
AND PUBLIC REACTIONS
Alarmed by the prospect of human cloning generated by Dolly, Congress
and the White House called for legislation in March of 1997 that would ban
19 Id.
20 Rae's description of the technical procedure is taken from Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Cloning:
Where Do We Draw the Line?, TIME, November 8, 1993, at 67.
21 Raymond G. Bohlin, The Little Lamb that Made a Monkey of Us All, March 7, 1997,
available at http://www.probe.org/docs/lambclon.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2002). Dr. Boh-
lin's analysis is confirmed by the findings of the NBAC, supra note 4, at 22. However, a
variation of the Dolly technique used by University of Hawaii researchers proved more effi-
cient, with an eighty percent success rate when employed by Japanese scientists who cloned
four calves in five attempts. See Derbyshire, supra note 15.
22 See, e.g., RAE, supra note 16, at 169-88; 1 NBAC, supra note 4, at 13-34.
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human cloning. President Bill Clinton, by executive order, prohibited the use
of federal funds for cloning.23 The President also requested that the National
Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) evaluate the legal and ethical ques-
tions raised by the possibility of human cloning.24 In arriving at its conclusion
and recommendations, the Commission conducted hearings over approximately
three months in which it heard testimony from scientists, philosophers,
bioethicists, legal scholars, theologians, and others. It also commissioned
papers by eight scholars from a diversity of fields, and these papers were then
published in Volume II of the NBAC's report.26
In its June 9, 1997 report, the Commission concluded that "it is morally
unacceptable for anyone in the public or private sector, whether in research or
clinical setting, to attempt to create a child using somatic cell nuclear transfer
cloning."2 7 The Commission gave two sets of reasons for this conclusion: (1) it
was concerned with the safety of the procedure for the embryo, fetus, and sub-
sequent child that may result from SCNT; and (2) it "found that concerns relat-
ing to the potential harms to children and effects on the moral, religious, and
cultural values of society merited further reflection and deliberation. '28 How-
ever, the Commission also asserted that "whether upon such further delibera-
tion our nation will conclude that the use of cloning techniques to create
children should be allowed or permanently banned is, for the moment, an open
question.
The Commission then made a number of recommendations, summarized
as follows:3" (1) the current moratorium on federal funding of SCNT should
continue; (2) non federally-funded researchers should voluntarily comply with
the moratorium; (3) scientific and professional "societies should make clear
that any attempt to create a child by somatic cell nuclear transfer and implanta-
tion into a woman's body at this time" is "an irresponsible, unethical, and
unprofessional act;"'" (4) any federal or state prohibition of SCNT should have
a sunset clause to force review of the policy and reassessment of its ethical
23 See Cloning Technology: Scientific Developments and Current Guidelines, 77 CONG.
DIG. 38 (Feb. 1998):
[R]estrictions have been in place in January 1996 which prohibit the Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS) from using Federal funds to support cloning research involving human
embryos. President Clinton's March 4 directive to all Executive departments and agencies
extends this ban to all federally supported research, but does not apply to research done in the
private sector.
Id.
24 The Clone Age, A.B.A. J., July 1997, at 68.
25 "To aid in these tasks NBAC invited testimony from an array of scientists, scientific
societies, ethicists, theologians, and legal experts, and heard from a variety of interested
parties during the public comment session at each meeting." 1 NBAC, supra note 4, at 9.
26 NAT'L BIOETHIcs ADVISORY COMM'N, 2 CLONING HUMAN BEINGS (1997) (hereinafter 2
NBAC). The scholars who contributed papers are Stuart H. Orkin, Janet Rossant, Elisa
Eiseman, Courtney S. Campbell, Dan W. Brock, Lori B. Anderson, Bartha Maria Knoppers,
and Robert Mullan Cook-Deegan.
27 1 NBAC, supra note 4, at iii.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 An overview of the commission's recommendations can be found id. at iii-v, 107-10.
31 Id.
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implications in the near future by an appropriate oversight committee (the
Commission suggested three to five years); (5) legislatures should carefully
craft any regulations or prohibitions so that they do not interfere with other
non-SCNT forms of human cloning (e.g., cloning of DNA sequences and cell
lines); (6) in the absence of legislative prohibitions, clinical use of SCNT "tech-
niques to create a child should be preceded by research trials that are governed
by the twin protections of independent review and informed consent, consistent
with existing norms of human subjects protection; '"32 (7) when other nations
and international organizations have policies on cloning, the U.S. government
should cooperate with those entities in enforcing shared aspects of those poli-
cies; (8) given the diversity of religious and ethical views in American culture,
the federal government should "encourage widespread and continuing delibera-
tion on these issues in order to further our understanding of the ethical and
social implications of this technology;"3 3 and (9) in order to further understand-
ing of scientific knowledge and its possible impact on one's values, beliefs, and
cultural practices, agencies and departments of the federal government should
seek out and support opportunities to provide information to the general public
in understanding genetics and other areas of research and discovery in the
biomedical sciences.
Since 1997, the U.S. Congress has proposed several bills,3 4 in both the
Senate and House of Representatives, that would have resulted in some ban on
32 Id. at 4.
33 Id. On November 28, 2001, President Bush, like his predecessor, President Clinton, cre-
ated his own bioethics commission (Executive Order 13237), The President's Council on
Bioethics (PCB). Like the NBAC, it provided to the president its own set of recommenda-
tions. However, at the time of the completion of this essay, only the pre-publication version
of that report is available: PCB, HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY: AN ETHICAL
INQUIRY (July 2002), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/cloningreport/ (last visited Octo-
ber 11, 2002) Assuming that there are no substantive changes in the final version, PBC
offers two recommendations, one by the majority (ten members) and the second by a minor-
ity (seven members).
The first is summarized in the following way:
Ten Members of the Council recommend a ban on cloning-to-produce-children combined with a
four-year moratorium on cloning-for-biomedical-research. We also call for a federal review of
current and projected practices of human embryo research, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis,
genetic modification of human embryos and gametes, and related matters, with a view to recom-
mending and shaping ethically sound policies for the entire field.
Id. The minority recommended "a ban on cloning-to-produce-children, with regulation
of the use of cloned embryos for biomedical research." Id. (bold typeface in original).
Although it may seem that the PCB majority's recommendation differs little from that of the
NBAC, a careful reading of the former, along with the reasons provided for its conclusion,
reveals a stronger condemnation of human cloning for reproduction as intrinsically wrong
and perhaps, also, for other purposes of cloning (hence, the call for a federal review of
current and projected research of pre-born human beings). The NBAC also condemns clon-
ing for reproduction, but not because it is intrinsically wrong, but rather, because it may have
bad consequences and society may not be adequately prepared for it; hence, its claim that
reproductive cloning is unethical "at this time." In addition, the NBAC report seems more
open to human cloning research outside of reproductive purposes than does the PCB report.
34 See, e.g., Human Cloning Prohibition Act, H.R. 923, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997) (asserting
that "[iut shall be unlawful for any person to use a human somatic cell for the process of
producing a human clone"); See also Human Cloning Prohibition Act, S. 1601, 105th Cong.
§ 3 (1997) (asserting that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person or entity, public or private, in
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human cloning and/or a ban on federal funding of human cloning research;
however, none could command a majority in either or both houses. This is
because disagreements arose over such issues as whether a federal ban should
apply only to government funding or include private research, whether the law
should ban both SCNT and embryo cloning, and whether the law should ban a
gestation of a clone rather than its creation. These distinctions, apparently sub-
tle but quite profound, touch on some of the deep issues that divide Americans
over such questions as the nature of human personhood, the importance of the
traditional family for human flourishing, and the weight of competing values
like personal autonomy and the pursuit of scientific knowledge.3 5 The apparent
conflict between these values came to the forefront in the context of another
hotly contested issue: the federal funding of stem-cell research. On August 9,
2001, President Bush, in an attempt to balance these competing values, called
for (1) no federal funding for the production of human embryos for the purpose
of extracting their stem cells and (2) federal funding for research on "more than
sixty genetically-diverse stem cell lines [that] already exist."36
Many states now have statutes that forbid some form of human cloning
and/or state funding of the practice.37 Other countries have also reacted
strongly against human cloning. For example, on January 12, 1998, the Coun-
cil of Europe proposed an international treaty that calls for the banning of clon-
or affecting interstate commerce, to use human somatic cell nuclear transfer technology");
H.R. 922, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 368, 105th Cong. (1997) (a bill, proposed by Senators
Ashcroft and Bond, seeking to codify President Clinton's executive order to ban federal
funding of cloning research); H.R. 2264, 105th Cong. (1997) (a bill banning federal funding
for "the creation of a human embryo or embryos for research purposes"); S. 1061, 105th
Cong. (1997); S. 1602, 105th Cong. (1998) (Proposed by Senators Kennedy and Feinsten,
this bill would not forbid embryo cloning but would make it illegal to "perform or use
somatic cell nuclear transfer with the intent of introducing the product of that transfer into a
woman's womb or in any other way creating a human being."); Cloning Research Prohibi-
tion Act, H.R. 3133, 105th Cong. (1998); Cloning Prohibition Act of 1998, S. 1599, 105th
Cong. (1998); Prohibition on Cloning Human Beings Acts of 1998, S. 1611, 105th Cong.
(1998); Cloning Prevention Act of 1999, H.R. 571, 106th Cong. (1999); Cloning Research
Prohibition Act, H.R. 2326, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 2439, 107th Cong. (2001) ("To prohibit
human cloning while preserving important areas of medical research, including stem cell
research"); S. 1899, 107th Congress (2001) ("[t]o amend title 18, United States Code, to
prohibit human cloning"); H. R. 1644, 107th Congress (2001) ("[t]o amend title 18, United
States Code, to prohibit human cloning").
" For differing views on these questions, see John A. Robertson, Liberty, Identity, and
Human Cloning, 76 TEx. L. REV. 1371 (1998); Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance:
Why We Should Ban the Cloning of Humans, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 679 (1998).
36 President George Bush, Remarks by the President on Stem Cell Research (Aug. 9, 2001),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/20010809-2.html (last vis-
ited October 12, 2002). According to the President,
[These stem-cell lines] were created from embryos that have already been destroyed, and they
have the ability to regenerate themselves indefinitely, creating ongoing opportunities for
research. I have concluded that we should allow federal funds to be used for research on these
existing stem cell lines, where the life and death decision has already been made.
Id.
" See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24185 (West 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.36.2 (West 1999); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 333.16274 (Michie 1999); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 1.217 (1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-16.4 (1998).
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ing human beings. 38 As of January 21, 2002, twenty-nine of the forty-one
member states that comprise the Council - and none of the non-member
nations (including the United States) - have signed the treaty. 39 Of the twenty-
nine that have signed the treaty, nine have ratified it, exceeding the number
required for the treaty to take effect (five ratifying states, including four mem-
ber states, are required for the treaty to take effect).,a In March 1997, the
World Health Organization (WHO) released an official pronouncement against
human cloning." Recently, however, because of the promise of stem-cell
research, Great Britain has sought to ease its ban on cloning in order to allow
embryo-cell research.4 2 Although numerous ethicists and public policy experts
have condemned cloning outright,4 3 others have taken stances ranging from
moderately conservative 4" to bordering on enthusiastic.4 " An extreme example
of the latter is Dr. Richard Seed, a Chicago physicist, who, in January 1998,
announced his intention to create a for-profit clinic that would clone human
beings.4 6
Public opinion seems firmly set against cloning. According to a March
1997 CNN Poll conducted among 1005 American adults (with a margin of
error of three percent): eighty-nine percent believed that cloning humans was
morally wrong; sixty-six percent believed that cloning animals was morally
wrong; sixty-nine percent of the respondents were scared of the possibility of
cloning human beings; and seventy-four percent said that human cloning is
38 See Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dig-
nity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, on the
Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings, available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/
cadreprincipal.htm (last visited October 12, 2002).
39 Nations that have signed the treaty are Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Esto-
nia, Finland, France, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxem-
bourg, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and
Turkey. Id.
40 The nine nations that have ratified the treaty are Czech Republic, Georgia, Greece, Hun-
gary, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. Id.
41 Clarke D. Forsythe, Human Cloning and the Constitution, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 469
(1998).
42 Emma Ross, Britain May Ease Ban on Cloning to Allow Embryo-Cell Research, PHILA-
DELPHIA INQUIRER, Aug. 17, 2000.
43 See, e.g., Lisa Sowle Cahill, No Human Cloning: A Social Ethics Perspective, 27 HOF-
sTRA L. REv. 487 (Spring 1999); Kass, supra note 35; Forsythe, supra note 41; and John
Finnis, Public Reason, Abortion, and Cloning, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 361 (1998).
4 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Rush to Caution: Cloning Human Beings, in CLONES AND
CLONES 262 (Martha Nussbaum & Cass R. Sunstein eds., 1998); See also James Q. Wilson,
The Paradox of Cloning, WKLY. STANDARD, May 26, 1997, at 23-27.
'5 See, e.g., Shannon H. Smith, Ignorance is Not Bliss: Why a Ban on Human Cloning Is
Unacceptable, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 311 (1999); Robert C.L. Moffat, Cloning Freedom:
Criminalization or Empowerment in Reproductive Policy?, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 583 (1998);
Laurence Tribe, On Not Banning Cloning for the Wrong Reasons, in CLONES AND CLONES,
supra note 44, at 221; GREGORY E. PENCE, WHO'S AFRAID OF HUMAN CLONING? (1998);
Robertson, supra note 35; Lawrence Wu, Family Planning Through Human Cloning: Is
There a Fundamental Right?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1461 (1998).
46 Nightline (ABC television broadcast, Jan. 7, 1998). Dr. Seed is quoted on the broadcast
as saying, "God made man in his own image and his plan for humankind is that we should
become one with God and this is a significant step in the right direction."
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against God's will, while nineteen percent disagreed with this assessment.4 7
According to an August 2000 Portrait of America poll, "64% of the country
says researchers have no right to clone human embryos for medical research,"
while "41% of the nation would allow cloning other animals such as pigs, cows
and sheep; 42% disagree. 78% of the country is against cloning humans; of
that percentage, 25% believe human embryonic cloning should be allowed for
the treatment of disease."4 8
III. THE USES OF CLONING
Why would anyone want to produce a clone? There are numerous rea-
sons,49 many of which can be divided into two general categories: (A) Repro-
ductive Reasons; and (B) Non-Reproductive Reasons. In section C, I will
explore some of the reasons against cloning.
A. Reproductive Reasons
Human cloning could be used for a number of reproductive reasons,
including the following: (1) a method of reproduction for infertile heterosexual
couples; (2) a means by which parents may be able to "replace" a dead child or
replicate a twin of an already existing child; and (3) a method of reproduction
for gay and lesbian couples whose sexual union is biologically incapable of
resulting in procreation.
Concerning the first, "human cloning would allow women who have no
ova or men who have no sperm to produce offspring biologically related to
them."5 Such potential parents may use the ovum of the female partner with
the genetic material of the male, or they may use another's ovum or the genetic
material of another individual - including the female partner's or that of a
friend, family member, or even a stranger - with a natural talent or an appear-
ance that is thought to be strongly connected to his or her genes (e.g., Michael
Jordan, Albert Einstein, Marilyn Monroe). Although it is likely that most
couples would choose cloning because of infertility, there are other concerns
that may motivate them. For example, one or both partners may have an inher-
itable disease that they do not want to pass on to their children. Thus, they may
choose to use only the genetic material of one of the partners or the genetic
material of a third party.
SCNT cloning may also be used by couples as a means to "clone someone
who had or has special meaning to them, such as a child who had died .... ""
Parents may also elect to use SCNT to clone a living child where the parents,
17 CNN Poll: Most Americans Say Cloning is Wrong (March 1, 1997), available at http://
www.cnn.com/TECH/9703/01/clone.poll/index.html.
48 Available at http://www.portraitofamerica.com/html/poll-1186.html (last visited Oct. 9,
2000).
49 For an extensive list and evaluation of reasons for and against cloning, including possible
individual and social harms and benefits, see David W. Brock, Cloning Human Beings: An
Assessment of the Ethical Issues Pro and Con, 2 NBAC, supra note 26, at E4-E21.
50 Id. at E7.
51 Id. at E9.
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for a variety of reasons (such as medical motives, e.g., the living child does not
have an inheritable disease), would like another child just like him or her.5"
It has been suggested by some that gay and lesbian couples may employ
SCNT so that they may be able to have children that result from the genetic
material of at least one member of the couple.53 And in the case of lesbians,
the ovum of one can be used with the genetic material of the other. Although
the resulting child would be the genetic twin of the latter, both partners would
have contributed to the child's existence.
B. Non-Reproductive Reasons
Someone may want to clone entire human beings, as well as incomplete
human beings, for purposes other than becoming a parent. For example, clon-
ing could be a plentiful resource for stem cells, which could "serve as the
starter stock for growing replacement nerve, muscle and other tissues that
might one day be used to treat patients with a variety of diseases."5 4 In addi-
tion, non-reproductive cloning holds out the possibility of increasing the supply
of tissues and organs for transplantation. Consider the following scenario: a
couple's one year-old child is suffering from two defective kidneys and, if no
donor of a healthy kidney can be found within one year, the child will die. If
cloning technology were available, the parents could theoretically clone their
child so that an identical twin could be produced and that twin could serve as a
kidney donor for the dying child. This is not as far-fetched as one may think.
Shannon H. Smith tells of a 1990 case in which "the parents of a nineteen year-
old suffering with leukemia chose to have another child in hopes of obtaining a
source for a bone marrow transplant. '5 5 The parents in question, the Ayalas,
did conceive and give birth to a child whose bone marrow matched that of their
52 This is suggested by Robertson, supra note 35, at 1392-94. Robertson writes:
The use of DNA from existing children to produce another child should also fall within a
couple's procreative liberty. This action is directly procreative because it leads to the birth of a
child who is formed from the egg and sperm of each spouse, even though it occurs asexually
with the DNA of an existing child and not from a new union of egg and sperm. Although it is
novel to create a twin after one has already been born, the act still allows the couple to
reproduce. The distinctly reproductive nature of their action is reinforced by the fact that they
will gestate and rear the child that they clone.
The parents' precise motive for cloning and subsequent transfer to the uterus will not affect
the reproductive nature of their endeavor. Whether they simply want a second child like the first,
want a second child who could be a source of tissue or organs, or want to replace a dead or dying
child with one with its genes, they are engaged in reproduction because another child of their
genes, whom they will gestate and rear, will be born.
Id. at 1393.
53 See, e.g., Anita Manning, Pressing a "Right" to Clone Humans: Some Gays Foresee
Reproduction Option, USA TODAY, Mar. 6, 1997, at D1; Timothy F. Murphy, Our Children,
Our Selves: The Meaning of Cloning for Gay People, in FLESH OF My FLESH: THE ETHICS
OF HUMAN CLONING 141 (Gregory E. Pence ed., 1998).
14 Cibelli et. al., supra note 2.
" Smith, supra note 45, at 325. According to Smith, "The father underwent surgery to
reverse a vasectomy (a procedure with a 40% success rate), and the mother became pregnant
at the age of 43, knowing that the odds were one in four that the baby's bone marrow would
match." Id. n.61; see Lance Morrow, When One Body Can Save Another: A Family's Act of
Lifesaving Conception Was on the Side of Angels, but Hovering in the Wings is the Devilish
Ghost of Dr. Mengele, TIME, June 17, 1991, at 54.
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dying nineteen year-old. Around the time the Ayalas were going thirough their
travail, an Indiana couple "chose to immediately attempt to have another child
in order to provide fetal stem cells to their newborn, who had been diagnosed
with Falconi's Anemia." The mother miscarried. She then "waited a month
and got pregnant again. When this child was born, she was an unsuitable
donor. Twelve weeks later, the mother was pregnant again, this time with a
child who turned out to be compatible."'5 6 Although these two cases were not
cases of SCNT, one can imagine that, if the couples could have had access to
such technology, they would have employed it in order to save their children's
lives.
Cloning of incomplete human beings is another possible, non-reproductive
purpose of cloning. For example, Dan W. Brock cites a proposal by Carol
Kahn, in which she argues that "[aifter cell differentiation, some of the brain
cells of the embryo or fetus would be removed so that it could then be grown as
a brain-dead body for spare parts for its earlier twin."57 According to Brock,
"this body clone would be like an anencephalic newborn or presentient fetus,
neither of whom arguably can be harmed, because of their lack of capacity for
consciousness."
58
C. Objections Raised Against Cloning
These possible uses of cloning have raised a number of ethical quandaries
that have legal implications. Here are some, but by no means all, of the
problems raised by critics of cloning.
59
1. Cloning Will Use and Destroy Prenatal Human Beings
In order to get to the point where science is capable of cloning human
beings with relative ease, literally hundreds of thousands of human embryos
will have to be brought into existence and then discarded. Cloning is not a
routine procedure. In the case of Dolly, 277 implants were created before
Dolly was produced. The numerous human embryos resulting from the work
of Hall and Stillman eventually perished. In order for Dr. Seed's proposed
cloning clinic to succeed, thousands of human embryos will have to be pur-
posefully brought into existence and then disposed. These embryos will not be
treated as intrinsically-valuable human subjects, but rather as things to be used
to further the ends of science or the benefit of others.
Of course, this concern has been countered by those who argue that,
because the Fourteenth Amendment does not recognize embryos and fetuses as
60protectable persons, it is permissible to experiment on them for the sake of
56 Smith, supra note 45, at 325; see Morrow, supra note 55, at 58.
57 Brock, supra note 49, at E8 (citing the work of Carol Kahn, Can We Achieve Immortal-
ity?: The Ethics of Cloning and Other Life Extension Technologies, FREE INQUIRY, Spring
1989, at 14-18).
58 Brock, supra note 49, at E8.
59 For more extensive criticisms of cloning, see Forsythe, supra note 41, at 527-42; Kass,
supra note 35; J.L.A. Garcia, Human Cloning: Never and Why Not, in LIFE AND LEARNING
IX: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH UNIVERSITY FACULTY FOR LIFE CONFERENCE 1 (Joseph
Koterski ed. 1998).
60 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973):
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some greater good for actual persons. 6 It is true that the Supreme Court has
ruled that a State's interest in prenatal life may never trump the privacy inter-
ests of the pregnant woman, at least prior to fetal viability. 62 But it does not
follow from that holding that embryos and fetuses, outside of the context of
pregnancy, ought not to be accorded any rights whatsoever.6 3 In fact, the rights
of embryos and fetuses have been increasingly acknowledged in both tort and
criminal law in a growing number of jurisdictions. 64  Given these points, it is
possible to argue that a State may prohibit cloning by combining two reasons:
(1) cloning involves the destruction of and experimentation on human embryos
The Constitution does not define 'person' in so many words. Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment contains three references to 'person' . . . . But in nearly all these instances, the use
of the word is such that it has application only postnatally. None indicates, with any assurance,
that it has any possible pre-natal application.
61 See, e.g., PENCE, supra note 45, at 85-98. Pence writes:
What is true about human embryogenesis ... will never be known precisely until we do experi-
ments with such human embryos. To say we cannot do such experiments because such embryos
are 'tiny persons' or because it violates the 'sanctity of life' is to say that humans are never
meant to know truths about how embryos develop, how genes regulate such development or fail
to do so in deleterious ways, and how it all goes together with the uterine environment to create a
baby's genotype.
Id. at 96-97.
62 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-65; Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
63 The Supreme Court, in Casey, seems to say as much when it writes:
Before viability, the State's interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or
the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman's effective right to elect the procedure...
the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the
woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (emphasis added).
6 See Forsythe, supra note 41, at 494-501. Forsythe writes:
Although the Supreme Court in 1973 virtually abolished abortion law, Roe did not touch assaults
on the unborn child outside the context of abortion. Roe stifled an ongoing process of increasing
state protection for unborn human life through state criminal and tort law. But, despite Roe, that
progressive process has continued outside the immediate context of abortion. The upshot of this
progression protection in both tort and criminal law has been an increasing abolition of the
obsolete born alive rule and a growth in protection of the unborn child, even if stillborn, without
regard to the stage of gestation. In tort law [as of 1997], virtually all states allow suits for
prenatal injuries for children later born alive. (Obviously, if the child is not born alive, the suit
would be for wrongful death.) A majority of state courts have expressly or implicitly rejected
viability as a limitation on liability for nonfatal prenatal injuries .... Some states, by statute,
have eliminated gestational time limits for recovery for injury or death to the unborn child.
Id. at 497. Forsythe continues that, as of 1997:
more than half of all states treat the killing of an unborn human being, at some stage of gestation,
as a form of homicide, even though the child is not born alive (stillborn). Eleven states, includ-
ing Illinois and Minnesota, define by statute the killing of an unborn child as a form of homicide,
regardless of the stage of pregnancy. One state defines by statute the killing of an unborn human
being after eight to ten weeks gestation as a form of homicide. Eight states define by statute the
killing of an unborn child after quickening as a form of homicide. Five states define by statute or
by caselaw the killing of an unborn human being after viability as a form of homicide. In several
cases, courts have rejected constitutional challenges to statutes of this type, including statutes
applying throughout gestation. State and federal courts have recognized that Roe only limits
state protection for the unborn human being when the woman's privacy interest is asserted.
Id. at 499-500 (footnotes omitted).
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and fetuses, and (2) the State has an interest in protecting potential life outside
of the context of pregnancy.65
2. Cloning May Undermine the Delicate Balance of Family Life
Imagine if an infertile couple were to produce a clone of the male partner
so that they may have a child of their own. This poses some interesting
problems. First, the "child" would technically be the father's brother, not the
father's son, which would make the "mother" her "son's" sister-in-law. In
addition, it would mean that her "son" is also her husband's twin brother. Sec-
ond, what if this couple were to clone another "child," but this time it is the
female partner's clone. This would make the "mother," paradoxically, both the
biological "father" and "mother" of the clone, her biological twin sister. Tech-
nically, this "child" would not be the sister of her "father's" "son." In fact, she
would be as much her "brother's" "sister" as her "father" is her "mother's"
brother. Thus, the "sister" and "brother" could marry each other and have chil-
dren the old-fashioned way, because, after all, their siblings, their clone-par-
ents, would have done so if not for being infertile.
Moreover, if a person were to clone himself, he would literally be giving
his parents a new child and his siblings a new heir with which to compete for
inheritance. Also, if this clone in turn were to clone himself, he would be
giving to his progenitor another sibling and to his progenitor's parents yet
another child.
Thus, critics of cloning argue that the distinctions between parent, child,
sister, and brother - the definitions which ground our notion of family life - are
at risk of unraveling if cloning is treated as just another exercise of "reproduc-
tive rights." In reply, perhaps legislators could craft laws in a way such that
these odd situations can be accommodated in order to fit into traditional catego-
ries (e.g., my clone, by law, would be my child and not my sibling). This
seems to have been accomplished in other contexts. For example, if my wife
and I were to adopt my baby sister after the unexpected deaths of our parents,
she would be my biological sister as well as my legal daughter. However, it is
difficult to know if such an accommodation would succeed if it were applied to
something as unique as cloning.
3. Cloning May Lead to Society Viewing Human Beings as
Commodities
Unlike other forms of reproductive assistance, SCNT, cloning allows one
to choose the particular genome for one's "offspring." Some have argued that
this sort of control over and selection of another's genome may result in view-
ing the child-clone produced as "made" rather than "begotten."6 6 That is, some
65 For a defense of this reading of the Supreme Court's view of reproductive liberty, see
infra Part IV.
66 See, e.g., Kass, supra note 35, at 693-98. Kass writes:
Human cloning would also represent a giant step toward turning begetting into making, procrea-
tion into manufacture ...a process already begun with IVF and genetic testing of embryos.
With cloning, not only is the process in hand, but the total genetic blueprint of the cloned indi-
vidual is selected and determined by the human artisans . . . we here would be taking a major
step into making man himself simply another one of the man-made things.
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argue that human cloning will have more in common with manufacturing than
procreating, and this will lead people to begin to think of these children (and
perhaps non-cloned children as well) as commodities selected for their attrib-
utes rather than as persons who should be valued for their own sake. Commod-
ities stand in an object-subject relation to their owners and/or their makers; that
is, commodities, by virtue of their nature, are inferior to the subjects who make
and own them. On the other hand, moral agents stand in a subject-subject rela-
tion to other moral agents, including their parents, spouses, children, and sib-
lings. Commodities are replaceable, while moral agents are not. You can
always get a new microwave oven to replace the defective one, but a clone of
one's deceased child is not really a replacement.
Nevertheless, defenders of human cloning believe that the "commodities
argument" is overstated. After all, as Lawrence Wu points out, parents already
exercise near absolute control over their children,
as evidenced by contraception, the timing of the birth, the choice of where to live,
and a host of developmental interventions, ranging from the trivial (e.g., piano les-
sons) to the considerable (e.g., boarding school or religion). Though selection of the
genome certainly does amount to complete control over an aspect of the child's life,
such control does not occur within a vacuum, but within a complex network of inter-
actions between the parent and child, where the parent is almost always exercising
some degree of control over the child's life. In this continuum, cloning per se does
not involve the type of control that will constrain or diminish the child's life (as
opposed to bad parenting) because his or her life will still be autonomous and inde-
terminate. Thus, selecting the genome can be understood as just another aspect of
acceptable parental control, albeit at the higher end of the continuum.
67
It seems, however, that Wu misses the point of the commodities argument.
It is not really about a parent's control over her child, for in the cases of accept-
able control listed by Wu, the child is treated as an end in himself, whom the
parent is directing and instructing, so that the child may become a flourishing
member of the community. But what troubles opponents of cloning is not that
people have the power to become parents and then exercise their parental
authority in helping to direct the development of their child. Rather, what trou-
bles them is that cloning will allow parents to have the power to choose their
children and their attributes, in much the same way they may choose a toaster,
automobile, or computer. For example, J. L. A. Garcia, an opponent of human
cloning, argues:
It strikes me as so transparently demeaning to a human being to make her a product
of technological manufacture that it is difficult to understand why some people claim
not to see it. This is not the way we have ever treated human beings; it is the way we
have always treated subhuman things we regard as wholly subject to our will. Thus,
cloning a human person is treated in a way otherwise reserved only for subhuman
beings. It is hard to know a better definition of degrading, depreciating .... Even
some advocates of cloning consider it "replication," not reproduction. It is hard to
see equal treatment or much acknowledgment of human equality in a situation where
one person is planned and designed by another, and then manufactured to the latter's
specifications.
6 8
Id. at 696.
67 Wu, supra note 45, at 1504-05.
68 Garcia, supra note 59, at 13.
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Of course, supporters of human cloning, such as Wu, maintain that "the
manufacturing aspect of cloning is not limited to this particular [assisted repro-
ductive technology], or even to noncoital reproduction."69 Some people, for
example, direct IVF, artificial insemination, and ordinary sexual procreation for
the same purposes that SCNT will likely be directed. Garcia replies by assert-
ing that this argument "shows not that such perversions are morally
unproblematic, but that they should be avoided and condemned everywhere and
that forms of reproduction that facilitate or encourage them have a heavy moral
presumption against them."
70
4. Non-Reproductive Uses of Cloning May Lead to Treating Human
Beings as Commodities
Some may also raise the commodity objection in reply to possible non-
reproductive uses of cloning. Concerning the cloning of entire human beings,
one may raise the question, Is it permissible to bring a human being into exis-
tence for the primary purpose of using him or her, or his or her parts, as means
by which to save or preserve another's life? Although some scholars believe
that such a use is morally permissible, and thus ought to be legally permissible
in both cloning and non-cloning scenarios, 7 1 they appeal to a broad interpreta-
69 Wu, supra note 45, at 1474-85. Wu writes, ".... the Constitution protects an affirmative
right to procreate through the use of cloning technology. Such technology compromises no
measure of individuality or humanity, and its use is consonant with the principle that procre-
ation is protected as a fundamental right because of the value of having children, and not
because of the mode used to create the children." Id. at 1515. Wu also writes:
Whenever a couple decides they want to "try" for a child and acts on that desire, the resulting
child will always, to some degree, be a product of their will, and will thus have been "made."
Parents, after all, seek to procreate for all sorts of reasons that sound in the objectification of
children - for instance, to replace a recently deceased child, to give their first child a playmate,
to save their marriage, to stem boredom, or because the family already has two daughters and the
father wants to try for a son. The particular mode of reproduction used does not alter that
manufactured aspect. Society, however, does not police such motivations for having children,
because it is generally assumed that parents will care for their children regardless of the motiva-
tions for having them.
Id. at 1505.
70 Garcia, supra note 59, at 13.
71 Smith, supra note 45, at 326 ("If cloning is held protected under procreative liberty,
cloning for purposes of having a child that is an acceptable organ donor would fall under that
protection as well."). See Robertson, supra note 35, at 1393-1421 ("The idea of cloning an
existing child is plausibly foreseeable in several circumstances .... [One circumstance] is
one in which an existing child might need an organ or tissue transplant." Id. at 1394.).
Citing the example of the case of the Ayalas, Robertson writes:
If the Ayalas acted ethically because they were prepared to love the child whose conception
was motivated by another child's potential need for bone marrow, then using an existing child's
DNA in order to have another child as a source of organs or tissue should also be acceptable ....
The fact that the child was also desired to serve as a source of tissue or organ does not negate the
love that parents will have for that child.
The question of objectification is somewhat different if cell biology advances to the point
that tissue or organs for transplant can be obtained from embryonic stem cells or early abortions.
In that case cloning another to obtain tissue or organs for transplant need only produce cloned
embryos or fetuses, and not live-born children, thus avoiding the problem of instrumentalizing a
child created in part to serve as an organ source.
Id. at 1421; See also Moffat, supra note 45, at 587-88:
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tion of reproductive liberty72 that they believe they can find in, and extract
from, a string of United States Supreme Court decisions tracing back to the
middle of the twentieth century.73 The logic of their case goes something like
this: the State may not conscript a woman's (or even a man's) body as a means
by which to sustain another's life or potential life because people have near
absolute bodily autonomy; it follows, then, that there is a fundamental right to
reproductive freedom which is broad enough to encompass cloning for both
reproductive and non-reproductive reasons.
Ironically, the critic of cloning could employ this same reasoning in order
to critique the justification of the sort of reproduction employed by the Ayalas
(and others) that may possibly extend to future uses of cloning human beings.
Their reasoning may go something like this: the same woman whose body can-
not be conscripted by the State for pregnancy ought not to be conscripted when
this body is less developed and the woman's mind less mature. For example, if
the parents of a fourteen year-old daughter cannot, according to the canons of
reproductive freedom, force their daughter to carry her prenatal sister in her
womb because her sister's mother is physically incapable of doing so, it is not
clear why it would have been permissible to bring that same fourteen year-old
into existence over fourteen years earlier so that her body may be used for the
purpose of saving another's life, such as that of her older sibling. Imagine if
these parents had combed the adoption rolls in order to find a suitable organ
donor for their dying child. Even if they promised to love that child and nur-
ture her in the same way they had loved and nurtured their dying child, it would
not make less true that the key condition for choosing that child, rather than
another, was her value as an organ donor for their dying child. Thus, it would
In the case of the child conceived to produce a bone marrow match, some critics object, in a
naive form of Kantianism, that the younger child is being treated solely as a means to an end.
When the child grows up and learns the story of her place in the family, will she feel that she was
created only to be used as an instrumentality? Actual experience with such situations indicates
that the child is loved not only as a member of the family, but is valued even more as the one
who saved the life of the older sibling.
Id. at 588.
72 Wu, supra note 45, at 1474-85. Wu writes:
[T]he Constitution protects an affirmative right to procreate through the use of cloning technol-
ogy. Such technology compromises no measure of individuality or humanity, and its use is
consonant with the principle that procreation is protected as a fundamental right because of the
value of having children, and not because of the mode used to create the child .... Furthermore,
granting constitutional protection is also more consistent with the longstanding recognition that
decisions regarding matters of fundamental concern, like procreation, are best left to the deci-
sionmaker, and not to the majority. Viewed properly, therefore, the cloning of humans presents
no threat to society or to the nature of reproduction or to the family; rather, human cloning is a
promising, new technology that can help would-be parents have children and create new
families.
Id. at 1515; See also Smith, supra note 45, at 320-23; Hong, supra note 11, at 752-55. Hong
writes, "The Court has found this right [to privacy] to be nearly inviolate in the context of
the right to procreate." Id. at 753.
73 These cases usually include the following: Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Thornburg v. Ameri-
can College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); and Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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seem that the appeal to reproductive liberty to justify cloning a child for organ
donation is much more problematic, given the premise - near absolute bodily
autonomy - on which reproductive liberty is thought by many to rest.
The cloning of incomplete human beings has its problems as well. Even
though, as Brock argues, "this body clone" could not arguably be harmed
because of its "lack of capacity for consciousness," '74 "most people would
likely find" the practice of purposely creating non-sentient human beings
"appalling and immoral, in part because here the cloned later twin's capacity
for conscious life is destroyed solely as a means to benefit another. ' 75
However, given the Supreme Court's claim that the fetus is not protected
under the Fourteenth Amendment,76 as well as Brock's belief that the presen-
tient fetus cannot be harmed, it is not precisely clear what would be wrong with
cloning brainless human beings for the purpose of harvesting their organs.
That is, if there is no injustice done to another and someone receives a benefit,
it is difficult to know where exactly the wrong is to be located in the act. I
suspect that some would locate it in the moral intuition that the presentient
fetus is deprived of something to which he is entitled. But if that is the case,
then current capacity for consciousness is a condition that is sufficient, but not
necessary,7 7 for a human being to possess both rights and a present capacity to
be harmed. Yet, what follows is that the intentional creation of brainless chil-
dren for the purpose of harvesting their organs is a serious wrong whose prohi-
bition should be reflected in our laws, for their presentient selves are rights-
bearers entitled to some protection by the wider community. 78 But if we were
7' Brock, supra note 49, at E8.
75 Id. at E9.
76 Roe, 410 U.S. at 157.
7 What this means is that, if one can identify actual human beings by determining whether
they have a current capacity for consciousness (C), it only follows that C is a sufficient
condition for being an actual human being. That is, if a human being (X) were to lack C, it
would not follow that X is not an actual human being, for if a condition is sufficient it does
not follow that it is necessary. For example, being a sister is a sufficient condition for being
female, though not a necessary condition, for one may be a female and an only child. How-
ever, being female is a necessary condition for being a sister, though not a sufficient one, for
one may have no siblings. Thus, we could reject C as a necessary condition for being an
actual human being on the grounds that we have good independent reasons to believe that
there are actual human beings that lack C, e.g., presentient fetuses, the comatose, etc.
78 According to this view, each kind of living organism or substance, including the human
being, maintains identity through change as well as possessing a nature or essence that
makes certain activities and functions possible. "A substance's inner nature is its ordered
structural unity of ultimate capacities. A substance cannot change in its ultimate capacities;
that is, it cannot lose its ultimate nature and continue to exist." J.P. Moreland, Humanness,
Personhood, and the Right to Die, 12.1 FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY 101 (January 1995).
For example, a German Shepherd dog, because it has a particular nature, has the ulti-
mate capacity to develop the ability to bark. It may die as a puppy and never develop that
ability. Regardless, it is still a German Shepherd dog as long as it exists, because it pos-
sesses a particular nature, even if it never acquires certain functions that by nature it has the
capacity to develop. In contrast, a frog is not said to lack something if it cannot bark, for it is
by nature not the sort of being that can have the ability to bark. A dog that lacks the ability
to bark is still a dog because of its nature. A human person who lacks the ability to think
rationally (either because she is too young or she suffers from a disability) is still a human
person because of her nature. Consequently, a human being's lack makes sense if and only
if she is an actual person.
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to extract from this insight the principle that seems to ground this wrong - it is
prima facie wrong to destroy another's capacity for a yet-to-be-achieved prop-
erty solely as a means to benefit another - then a fundamental aspect of repro-
ductive freedom, the right to abortion, is imperiled by that principle: according
to the United States Supreme Court, the right to abortion is justified precisely
because a woman undergoing an abortion is merely destroying the fetus'
capacity for, as opposed to its current possession of, actual life.
79
Second, the German Shepherd remains the same particular German Shepherd over time
from the moment it comes into existence. Suppose you buy a German Shepherd as a puppy
and name him "Fred." When you first bring him home you notice that he is tiny in compari-
son to his parents and lacks their intellectual and physical abilities. But, over time, Fred
develops these abilities, learns a number of things his parents never learned, sheds his hair,
has his nails clipped, becomes ten times larger than he was as a puppy, and undergoes
significant development of his cellular structure, brain, and cerebral cortex. Yet, this grown-
up Fred is identical to the puppy Fred, even though he has gone through significant physical
changes. Why? Because living organisms and substances maintain identity through change.
Consider another example. Suppose your Uncle Jed is in a terrible car accident that
results in his being in a coma from which he may or may not wake. Imagine that he remains
in this state for roughly two years and then awakens. He seems to be the same Uncle Jed
that you knew before he went into the coma, even though he's lost some weight, hair, and
memories. Was he a person during the coma? Could the physicians have killed Uncle Jed's
body during that time because it was not functioning as a person? If one holds that current
capacity for consciousness is a necessary condition for rights, it is difficult to see why it
would be wrong to kill Uncle Jed while he is in the coma. Yet, it would be morally wrong to
kill Uncle Jed while in this state.
Suppose you were to conclude that Uncle Jed's life is valuable while in the coma
because, at one time prior to the coma, he functioned as a person and probably will do so in
the future after coming out of the coma. But this would be a mistake. For we can change the
story a bit and say that when Uncle Jed awakens from the coma, he loses virtually all his
memories and knowledge, including his ability to speak a language, engage in rational
thought, and have a self-concept. It turns out that while in the coma he was in the exact
same position as the standard fetus or embryo, for he had the same capacities as the fetus or
embryo. He would still literally be the same person he was before the coma, but he would be
more like he was before he had a "past." He would have the natural inherent capacity to
speak a language, engage in rational thought, and have a self-concept, but he would have to
develop and learn them all over again in order for these capacities to result, as they did
before, in actual abilities.
For a defense of this view, see J.P. MORELAND & ScoTr B. RAE, BODY & SOUL:
HUMAN NATURE AND THE CRISIS IN ETHICS (2000). For a critique of this view, see Michael
Tooley, In Defense of Abortion and Infanticide, in THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY 25 YEARS
AFTER ROE V. WADE: A READER 209 (Louis P. Pojman & Francis J. Beckwith eds., 2d ed.
1998).
" In the majority and plurality opinions of the leading cases that affirm a woman's right to
abortion - Roe, Doe, Thornburg, and Casey - the Court refers to the fetus as potential,
rather than actual, life. This is important because if the fetus were considered actual life by
the Court, then there would be no right to abortion. For, in Roe, Justice Blackmun concedes
that the most important premise in establishing the right to abortion is the non-personhood of
the fetus: "If the suggestion of personhood [of the unborn] is established, the appellant's
case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life is then guaranteed specifically by the
[Fourteenth Amendment]." Roe, 410 U.S. at 157-58. But Blackmun writes elsewhere in
Roe, "We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in
the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any
consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a
position to speculate." Id. at 160. But this poses a curious problem for the justification of
abortion rights. For if, as Blackmun admits, the right to abortion is contingent upon the
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IV. REPRODUCTIVE LIBERTY
Is the constitutional right to reproductive liberty broad enough to encom-
pass cloning? It depends.8° There are aspects of the Supreme Court's deci-
sions on reproductive liberty that seem to point toward personal autonomy on
matters of lifestyle, marital choices, and intimacy as being part of the founda-
tion of that liberty. If that is the case, then it seems that there is a constitutional
right to clone that states may restrict only if there is a compelling State interest.
On the other hand, there are aspects of these same Supreme Court decisions
that seem to point toward viewing reproductive liberty as merely allowing indi-
viduals the right to reject the burden of pregnancy and subsequent childrearing.
That is, there is no jurisprudential basis for affirming a constitutional right
either to clone or employ other reproductive technologies that one could rea-
sonably infer from these decisions. Although the Court could go in either
direction, it seems to me that a plausible reading of these cases does not entail a
constitutional right to clone.
The first hint at a right to reproductive liberty can be found in Skinner v.
Oklahoma.81 In that case, the Court ruled in favor of a male plaintiff, an habit-
ual criminal who, after being convicted for his most recent crime, was ordered
by the trial court to undergo the "operation of vasectomy"82 so that his undesir-
able genetic traits could not be passed on to offspring. Although not dealing
with the scientific credibility of such a claim, the Court ruled in the majority
opinion (authored by Justice Douglas) that the Oklahoma statute providing the
jury its justification to order the punishment violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the statute did not allow for the
punishment of sterilization for higher classes of thieves (e.g. embezzlers),
whose wayward practices could be just as habitual as those of Skinner and
other small-time crooks.83
Chief Justice Stone pointed out in his concurring opinion that the Equal
Protection Clause argument proposed by Justice Douglas does not correctly
identify the wrong in the Oklahoma statute. For if the statute had punished all
habitual thieves equally - chicken thieves and embezzlers alike - by requiring
that the state sterilize them, one would still think that there is something wrong
with such a statute.84 Stone believed he had found a solution to this awkward
status of the fetus, then the allegedly disputed fact about life's beginning means that the right
to abortion is disputed as well. For a conclusion's support - in this case, "abortion is a
fundamental right" - is only as good as the truth of its most important premise - in this case,
"the fetus is not a human person." As a result, the Court's admission that abortion-rights are
based on a widely disputed fact, far from establishing a right to abortion, entails that the
Court not only does not know when life begins, but it does not know when, if ever, the right
to abortion begins.
80 Cass Sunstein has authored an article that includes two imaginary Supreme Court deci-
sions, one in which the Court rules reproductive liberty encompasses cloning and a second in
which the Court rules that reproductive liberty is not broad enough to include cloning. Cass
Sunstein, The Constitution and the Clone, in CLONES AND CLONES, supra note 44, at 207-20.
8l 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
82 Id. at 537 (Douglas, J.).
83 Id. at 538-41.
8 Id. at 543-44 (Stone, J., concurring).
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consequence in the Due Process Clause: 85 the State of Oklahoma has the bur-
den to prove, in a fair procedure, that it can justify its intent to surgically and
permanently remove the function for which Skinner's reproductive equipment
was designed, to sire offspring. Nevertheless, both the holding of the majority,
as well as the concurring opinion, seem less like affirmations of reproductive
liberty and more like opinions about the morality of equal treatment and the
level of judicial scrutiny required to allow State-mandated battery.
However, the aspect of Skinner's majority opinion that seems to have
stood the test of time (though it is uncertain whether it was part of the Court's
holding) - and seems to have had an influence in the formation of the plurality
opinion (authored by Justice Douglas) in Griswold v. Connecticut - is the sec-
tion in which Justice Douglas wrote that "[m]arriage and procreation are funda-
mental to the very existence and survival of the race. The power to sterilize, if
exercised, may have subtle, far reaching and devastating effects."86 In Gris-
wold, the Court ruled as unconstitutional a Connecticut statute that forbade the
use of, sale of, and/or the assisting in the use of contraceptive devices. 87 Jus-
tice Douglas concluded that the right of privacy grounds this judgment, for the
wrongness of this statute lies in its broad scope: it includes the private judg-
ments and activities of couples within the sanctuary of marriage. This right of
privacy, according to Douglas, can be gleaned not from a literal reading of the
words found in the Bill of Rights but from "penumbras" that stand behind these
words, and these penumbras are "formed by emanations from those guarantees
that help give them life and substance.,"88 What was tucked-away in Skinner
becomes explicit in Griswold:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights - older than our political
parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an associ-
ation that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths;
a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as
noble purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
89
It seems that, according to Justice Douglas, the right to marry and form a
family is logically and chronologically prior to the state. What the Court seems
concerned about is that Connecticut, through its anti-contraception statute,
interfered with the sanctity of marriage and the couple's judgments about inti-
mate matters, including reproduction.90 In his concurring opinion, Justice
Goldberg understood the plurality's rejection of the Connecticut statute as
firmly grounded in this notion of marital sanctity.9 1 But because of this under-
85 Id. at 544-45.
86 Id. at 541 (Douglas, J.).
87 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
88 Id. at 484 (Douglas, J.).
89 Id. at 486.
90 "We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of
laws that touch on economic problems, business affairs, and social conditions. This law,
however, operates directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician's
role in one aspect of that relation." Id. at 482.
91 In his concurrence, Justice Goldberg stated:
The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that clearly underlie its specific guarantees
demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy and to marry and raise a family are of similar order
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standing, Goldberg did not think that reproductive liberty and the right of pri-
vacy were endlessly elastic, for he maintained that "the Court's holding today
... in no way interferes with a State's proper regulation of sexual promiscuity
and misconduct, '9 2 and then approvingly cited Justice Harlan's comments in
Poe v. Ullman: "Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies
which the State forbids... but the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily
an essential and accepted feature of the institution of marriage which the State
not only must allow, but which always and in every age it has fostered and
protected."93
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court ruled that a Massachusetts statute vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause because it provided, in its laws regarding the
distribution of contraceptive devices, "dissimilar treatment for married and
unmarried persons who are similarly situated." 94 In the words of Justice Bren-
nan, author of the majority opinion:
If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot be
prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally impermissi-
ble. It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital
relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and
heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellec-
tual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision to bear or beget a
child.95
It seems that, at this point in the historical trajectory of the right of pri-
vacy, one could reasonably infer that reproductive liberty was moving in a lib-
ertarian direction. That is, the Court was setting into motion certain principles
of constitutional liberty that were at such a high level of abstraction that it
would become nearly impossible for a community to proscribe in its laws the
sorts of research and reproductive technologies that are presently offered, or
may soon be offered (e.g., human cloning), in twenty-first century North
America.
In Roe v. Wade, the Court established a right to abortion based on the right
of privacy found in Griswold and Eisenstadt, as well as other decisions.9 6
However, it would be a mistake, the Court explained, to think of this fight as
and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected .... The fact that no particular
provision of the Constitution explicitly forbids the State from disrupting the traditional relation
of the family - a relation as old and as fundamental as our entire civilization - surely does not
show that Government was meant to have the power to do so.
Id. at 495-96 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
92 Id. at 498-99.
I ld. at 499 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961)).
9 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454.
95 Id. at 453.
96 Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-56:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal
liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in
the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
Id. at 153.
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absolute,97 for the Court took into consideration the legitimate State interests of
both the health of the pregnant woman and the prenatal life she carries. Con-
cerning the former, the Court allowed States to regulate abortion, as they may
regulate other medical facilities and other procedures.98 In regard to prenatal
life, the Court thought the question of metaphysical personhood to be outside
the realm of the Court's expertise,9 9 even though the Court asserted that the
fetus is not a person according to the Constitution." ° In any event, the State's
interest in prenatal life increases as the fetus develops; °10 and when it reaches
the point of viability, the State may restrict abortion, except in cases in which
an abortion is necessary to preserve the health or life of the pregnant woman. 0 2
Thus, reproductive liberty in the context of Roe should be seen as a limited
freedom, established within the nexus of three parties: the pregnant woman, the
fetus, and the State. The woman's liberty trumps both the value of the fetus
and the interests of the State, except when the fetus reaches viability (and an
abortion is unnecessary to preserve the life or health of the pregnant woman)
and/or when the State has a compelling State interest in regulating abortion
97 "[A]ppellant and some amici argue that the woman's right is absolute and that she is
entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time she alone chooses. With this we do not
agree." Id. The Court wrote elsewhere in Roe:
The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute. In fact, it is not clear to us
that the claim asserted by some amici that one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as
one pleases bears a close relationship to the right of privacy previously articulated in the Court's
decisions. The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right of this kind in the past. Jacob-
son v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (vaccination); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)
(sterilization).
Id. at 154.
9s "The State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other medical
procedure, is performed under circumstances that ensure maximum safety for the patient."
Id. at 150.
99 "We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in
the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any
consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a
position to speculate." Id. at 160.
100 "The Constitution does not define 'person' in so many words. Section 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment contains three references to 'person' . . . . But in nearly all these
instances, the word is such that it has application only postnatally. None indicates, with any
assurance, that it has any possible pre-natal application." Id. at 157.
101 The Court went on to declare:
[T]he State does have an important and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the health
of the pregnant woman, whether she be a resident of the State or a nonresident who seeks medi-
cal consultation and treatment there, and that it has still another important and legitimate interest
in protecting the potentiality of human life. These interests are separate and distinct. Each
grows substantially as the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, each
becomes 'compelling.' . . . . With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in
potential life, the 'compelling point' is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably
has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb."
Id. at 162-63.
102 "If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to
proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or
health of the mother." Id. at 163-64.
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before and after viability in order to make sure that the procedure is performed
in accordance with accepted medical standards.
10 3
As one might guess, this reading of Roe is not universally embraced. This
is why some courts1" and some scholars °5 see Roe and its predecessors as
establishing a near absolute right to reproductive liberty (including the use of
reproductive technologies, such as cloning). On the other hand, some courts 10 6
and scholars"0 7 embrace a reading similar to the one I am presenting here.
Regardless of which is the correct interpretation of these cases, it seems
that the Supreme Court, since the late 1980s, has come to embrace the latter
interpretation. For this reason, the Court will likely leave the question of
human cloning to the state and federal legislatures rather than attempt to settle
the issue by judicial fiat. That is, the Court seems to have shifted to a more
minimalist perspective when it comes to constitutional interpretation; for there
seems to be reluctance to lay down highly abstract principles of moral philoso-
phy that could be extended beyond their intended use in particular cases.'0 8
There are several reasons to believe this is the case.
First, in the five-four decision of Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), the Supreme
Court stopped the expansion of the right of privacy in its tracks when it rejected
the argument that Georgia's anti-sodomy statute violated that right."° Thus,
103 Since the Court accepts the view that the primary reason for states prohibiting abortion
by criminal statute in the 19th century and in early 20th century was to "protect the pregnant
woman . . . from submitting to a procedure that placed her life in serious jeopardy," and
since "modem medical techniques have altered this situation" for the better, there is no
compelling reason to criminalize abortion prior to viability. Id. at 149. For a reply to this
argument, see James Witherspoon, Reexamining Roe: Nineteenth-Century Abortion Statutes
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 29 (1985).
11 See, e.g., Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1376 (N.D. Ill. 1990), affd without
opinion, 914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom., Scholberg v. Lifschez, 498
U.S. 1069 (1991) (striking down state statute that prohibited fetal experimentation because it
was unconstitutionally vague and violated "a woman's right of privacy, in particular, her
right to make reproductive choices free of governmental interference with those choices");
See also Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1984), aff'd on other grounds,
Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 999 (5th Cir. 1986) ("the use of the terms 'experi-
ment' and 'experimentation' makes the statute impermissibly vague").
105 See, e.g., Wu, supra note 45, at 1474-85; John A. Robertson, Decisional Authority over
Embryos and Control of IVF Technology, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 285, 292 (1988).
106 See, e.g., Jane L. v. Bangerter, 794 F. Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 1992) (upholding a state
statute that forbids using prenatal children in experimentation).
107 See, e.g., Forsythe, supra note 41, at 517-27; Paul L. Linton, Planned Parenthood v.
Casey: The Flight from Reason in the Supreme Court, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 15
(1993).
108 For a provocative defense in favor of this type of judicial minimalism, see Cass R.
Sunstein, Dred Scott v. Stanford and Its Legacy, in GREAT CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
64 (Robert P. George ed., 2000).
'1 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that the right of privacy does not
apply to homosexual sodomy, since it is not a fundamental right grounded in our nation's
traditions and institutions). In his dissent, Justice Blackmun would like to take the right of
privacy to a higher level of generality so that homosexual sodomy is protected. He chastises
the Court for not truly appreciating the constitutional right of privacy and how it applies to
intimate personal decisions about one's own sexuality. He understands the right of privacy
in previous decisions (e.g., Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe) as grounded in the right to be let
alone, which would make it unconstitutional to legally forbid consenting adults from engag-
ing in sodomy in the privacy of their own homes. Id. at 199-214.
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the right of privacy has limits, and a state may restrict certain conduct, even if it
occurs in private between consenting adults.
Second, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992), the Court more carefully
defined the right to abortion in terms of a woman's right to avoid the burden of
unwanted pregnancy. " 0 Although such reasoning was not absent from Roe,"'
the Casey plurality seems to have crafted its opinion in order to accentuate the
State's interest in prenatal life and that that interest may only be trumped by a
woman's fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy."i 2 Thus, a State's pro-
tection of prenatal life, outside of the abortion context, is not impermissible.
Unfortunately for the authors of the plurality opinion, a particular passage
from it has been taken by lower courts and some scholars (see below) to estab-
lish a near absolute right to personal autonomy:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education ....
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make
in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mys-
tery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion by the State.
1 1 3
1 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 852:
Though abortion is conduct, it does not follow that the State is entitled to proscribe it in all
instances. That is because the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human
condition and so unique to the law. The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to
anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she can bear .... Her suffering is too intimate
and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman's role,
however dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and our culture. The destiny
of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual impera-
tives and her place in society.
Id.
... See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153:
The detriment that the State would impose on the pregnant woman by denying this choice alto-
gether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may
be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and
future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child
care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there
is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to
care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of
unwed motherhood may be involved. All these are factors the woman and her responsible physi-
cian necessarily will consider in consultation.
Id.
112 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 869:
From what we have said so far it follows that it is a constitutional liberty of the woman to have
some freedom to terminate her pregnancy. We conclude that the basic decision in Roe was
based on a constitutional analysis which we cannot now repudiate. The woman's liberty is not
unlimited, however, that from the outset the State cannot show its concern for the life of the
unborn, and at a later point in fetal development the State's interest in life has sufficient force so
that the right of the woman to terminate the pregnancy can be restricted ... the urgent claims of
the woman to retain the ultimate control over her destiny and her body, claims implicit in the
meaning of liberty, require us to perform that function.
Id.
113 Id. at 851 (citations omitted).
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In 1994, Federal District Court Judge Barbara Rothstein struck down
Washington state's ban on physician-assisted suicide. In her opinion she
employed what she thought was the logic of Casey: "Like the abortion deci-
sion, the decision of a terminally ill person to end his or her life 'involves the
most intimate and personal choices a person can make in a lifetime,' and con-
stitutes a 'choice central to personal dignity and autonomy."" 14 Legal philoso-
pher Ronald Dworkin makes a similar claim:
Our Constitution takes no sides in these ancient disputes about life's meaning. But it
does protect people's right to die as well as live, so far as possible, in the light of
their own intensely personal convictions about "the mystery of human life." It insists
that these values are too central to personality, too much at the core of liberty, to
allow a majority to decide what everyone must believe. 1 15
It is not difficult to imagine, given Rothstein's and Dworkin's interpreta-
tion of Casey, that one could conclude that there exists a near absolute right to
personal autonomy that would include both a right to physician-assisted suicide
as well as a right to clone. However, in Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court
corrected this interpretation of its "autonomy passage":
By choosing this language, the Court's opinion in Casey described, in a general way
and in light of our prior cases, those personal activities and decisions that this Court
has identified as so deeply rooted in our history and traditions, or so fundamental to
our concept of constitutionally ordered liberty, that they are protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. The opinion moved from the recognition that liberty necessarily
includes freedom of conscience and belief about ultimate considerations to the obser-
vation that "though the abortion decision may originate within the zone of conscience
and belief, it is more than a philosophic exercise." That many of the rights and
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not
warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal
decisions are so protected, and Casey did not suggest otherwise. 116
Thus, the Glucksberg Court saw its "autonomy passage" in Casey as hav-
ing application limited to those activities that can be grounded in identifiable
and deeply-rooted traditions, as well as that which is fundamental to the con-
cept of ordered liberty. Therefore, the Court concluded that there is not a right
to physician-assisted suicide as there is a right to abortion." 7
1 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1459-60 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
115 Ronald Dworkin, When Is It Right to Die?, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1994, at A19.
116 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727-28 (1997) (citations omitted) (first
emphasis in original; second emphasis, in final sentence, added).
117 Susan F. Appleton, however, argues that "a closer look at the majority's analysis [in
Glucksberg] . . . raises questions about whether a constitutional right to abortion truly
escapes unscathed." Susan F. Appleton, Assisted Suicide and Reproductive Freedom:
Exploring Some Connections, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 15, 19 (1998). She draws this conclusion
from the Court's two tests in its analysis of the claim that physician-assisted suicide is a
Constitutional right: (1) Is the claimed right deeply rooted in our Nation's tradition and
history?; and (2) Can one provide a careful description of precisely what fundamental lib-
erty interest is claimed, as substantive due-process cases require? Appleton argues that sub-
jecting the abortion right to these two tests may make the right less stable because (1) if the
Court were to argue that the relevant tradition and history for assessing the abortion right is
the time in which the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, this test becomes problematic for
sustaining a right to abortion, even though the Court's historical case in Roe is more persua-
sive, according to Appleton, when one includes its presentation of ancient and common law
attitudes toward abortion, and (2) if abortion is viewed as situated "in more expansive pro-
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This provides an important clue as to how the Court may rule concerning
the question of whether the right of privacy is broad enough to encompass a
right to clone. For, like physician-assisted suicide, cloning, as we have seen, is
a matter over which there is a profound debate regarding its morality, legality,
and practicality." 8 In addition, cloning, like physician-assisted suicide, is not
grounded in our nation's history and traditions. 9 Strong evidence of such is
found in the largely negative political, legal, and public reaction to cloning in
the United States, as well as the NBAC's and PCB's conclusions and careful
analysis of the issue. 2 ' Therefore, it is likely that the Court will say the same
thing about cloning that is has said about physician-assisted suicide:'
"Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound
debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted sui-
cide. Our holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic
society." 122
V. CONCLUSION
Given what we have covered in this essay, it seems to me that the
Supreme Court could reasonably, and is likely to, reject a constitutional right to
clone. The Court may employ something like the following argument:
1. The right of privacy establishes the right of contraceptive use. (Gris-
wold, Eisenstadt).
2. The right of privacy encompasses the right to abortion, though that
right is the result of a balance between three interests: the woman's
burden of pregnancy and future childrearing, the State's interest in the
fetus, and the State's interest in maternal health. (Roe, Casey).
3. Therefore, it is not unconstitutional for a State to ban or restrict clon-
ing, because such an action would not involve a ban on contraceptive
use and/or an absolute prohibition of a woman's right to abortion.
4. Cloning, like physician-assisted suicide, is a controversial matter better
left to public discussion, deliberation, and debate. (Glucksberg).
5. Given (3) and (4) above, a State may ban cloning on any rational basis,
including for the purpose of protecting unborn human life (as has been
done in tort and criminal statutes and common law cases), preventing
the commodification of children and their parts, or preserving the integ-
tection that includes bodily integrity, family autonomy, and freedom of conscience ... that
formulation would then fail the 'precision' test," even though it "offers considerable support
from this country's history and tradition." Id. at 19, 20 (citations omitted).
118 See supra Part ILI.
119 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 708-19 (presenting a history of the prohibition of suicide and
assisting suicide from common law until the mid-1990s).
120 See supra Part II.
121 Appleton comes to a similar conclusion: "No doubt, the two-part test announced in
Glucksberg would create significant obstacles for an expansive constitutional right to repro-
ductive choice that includes protection for access to assisted conception and other 'high-
tech' procedures." Appleton, supra note 117, at 20. Presumably, one such procedure could
be cloning.
122 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735.
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rity of the family, an institution whose right to exist predates the Bill of
Rights (Griswold).
Of course, this does not mean that cloning ought not to be permitted or
that scientists ought not do research in this area. It means simply that, given
the Supreme Court's current trajectory on the matter of reproductive liberty,
there is no constitutional right to clone.
